Truman and the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Intelligence and its Role in the Decision-Making Process
President Truman announces the surrender of Japan to the White House Press Corps in the Oval Office on August 6, 1945 (Image courtesy of the Atomic Heritage Foundation).
Whether it was “right” or “wrong” of President Truman to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is highly debated and has been debated since August 6th and 9th, 1945. The attacks were brutal and had long lasting effects on the Japanese, but President Truman maintained until the day he died that he had regrets about the decision.
Essay by Emily Barkann, Chief White House Correspondent
Looking into the past and considering the events of World War II allows the global community to confront questions regarding intelligence in ways that have revolutionized international relations and warfare throughout time. While the implications of intelligence are cause for further discussion, one event in particular stands out from the others and raises a question regarding the role intelligence played in the advisory process prior to the event. The decision-making process and advisory opinions that former President Harry S. Truman went through and took into consideration when determining whether to drop nuclear bombs upon the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still popular topics of conversation, with some arguing that he and his cabinet were justified in the decision and others arguing that it was an evil choice. Part of the discussion that is typically left out is whether any information that the United States’ intelligence agencies at the time influenced the decision that the president made to drop the bombs. After a long chain of events including the Quebec Agreement, air raids on Japan, the potential implementation of Operation Downfall, and the Potsdam Declaration, President Truman had to make a decision that had the potential to (and did) change the course of World War II and the future of the world. I hope to determine in the remainder of this paper, whether the intelligence that President Truman’s administration gathered made a difference in his decision regarding the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II.
Truman and his Relationship with U.S. Intelligence
The most valuable way to understand whether intelligence influenced President Truman’s decision to drop the nuclear bombs, is to understand his relationship with United States intelligence. For the purposes of examining President Truman’s experience with foreign intelligence, it can be defined as:
Information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements foreign organizations, or foreign persons. Intelligence is not only a product or information, but it is also process in a cycle. In this cycle, the President of the United States has responsibilities in issuing requirements, providing oversight in collecting information and providing feedback. Covert action – or other covert operations – is defined in later legislation as ‘an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.
In the simplest terms, by the time President Truman’s presidency ended, he had a thorough understanding of U.S. intelligence—after all, he established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. President Truman’s relationship with U.S. intelligence begins with the end of his vice presidency. Immediately following the death of President Roosevelt 82 days into the term, Truman was sworn in as president, inheriting the pressures and demands of World War II. This was an incredibly overwhelming transition for President Truman, given that during his vice presidency, he was not privy to the information and intelligence that President Roosevelt had prior to his death. This immediately changed when he was sworn into office. He asked all the members of President Roosevelt’s cabinet to stay in their roles and notified them that he was to make the decisions and they were to support him.
During the onset of World War II, President Roosevelt had established “the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS)…to gather information abroad.” The plan was to dissolve the office following the war.
Differences of opinion about the role of intelligence in the post-war government, magnified by the personal differences between Truman and [General William J.] Donovan, led to the liquidation of the OSS and Donovan’s dismissal. To understand the positions he took, it is necessary to recognize that Truman had virtually no experience in intelligence. To be sure, he was an ‘internationalist’ who later claimed to have ‘read a lot about foreign affairs before joining the administration.’ But anyone can read reports. The real expertise is knowing how intelligence is gathered – covertly and overtly – and once obtained, being able to take action on it. Truman earned his modest political clout from his efforts in domestic affairs.
While Truman’s initial lack of intelligence prowess briefly caused an intelligence regression, he quickly realized the need for centralized intelligence rather than intelligence spread across various state agencies stating, “On becoming President I found that the needed intelligence information was not co-ordinated at any one place. Reports came across my desk on the same subject at different times from the various departments and these reports often conflicted.” Truman then set out to create a centralized intelligence system. This process was not without failures and missteps—including the defunct Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Proponents of a new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) consistently lobbied the president in attempts to convince him to establish the office. “By the summer of 1946, it was clear to many in Truman’s administration – except Truman himself – that something had to be done about the Central Intelligence Group. As events unfolded, it is apparent that Truman, rather than leading the charge, merely relented to the pleases of [Lieutenant General Hoyt] Vandenberg and other subordinates that he include the Central Intelligence Agency in the National Security Act of 1947.” Despite Truman’s rather elementary understanding of intelligence at this point in time, he ultimately benefitted and consistently used and valued the existence of the agency.
History of US Foreign Policy Towards Japan
The United States’ relationships with foreign nations ebb and flow—at times nations are great allies, at others they are mortal enemies. Prior to World War II, the United States and Japan had an amicable relationship with both nations growing substantially throughout industrialization. One of the first signs of possible United States aggression towards Japan was the annexation of Hawaii. The United States wanted to ensure that they maintained their naval power and needed a way to protect the Pacific and Pacific coast of the United States in the event of a confrontation with Japan. Despite this, the two nations were able to remain peaceful. Throughout the late-1800’s and early 1900’s, many laws were enacted to prevent Japanese people from immigrating to or owning land in the United States. “The year 1900 saw the real beginning of anti-Japanese agitation…Through the annexation of Hawaii in 1898, all indentured labor contracts in the Islands had been automatically abrogated, thus liberating thousands of Asiatic peons. Many of them came to the mainland…This increased migration gave rise to the first wave of resentment by the white workers of the state, an attitude which was adroitly exploited by the political agitators anxious to secure the labor vote.” This resentment towards the Japanese culminated with laws and agreements that discriminated against the Japanese, including the California Alien Land Law of 1913 which “denies to aliens ineligible for citizenship the right to own, lease, or otherwise enjoy land except to the extent provided by treaty…and has been enforced solely as a discriminatory law directed against the Japanese.” These were the beginnings of xenophobic behaviors exhibited towards the Japanese that strongly existed throughout World War II.
Foreign policy towards the Japanese at the onslaught of World War I became more positive, with Japan joining the Allied Powers, but the United States became immediately suspicious about Japan. In an attempt to grow their power in Asia, Japan agreed upon a revised version of the Twenty-One Demands with China. The plan detailed a variety of demands to gain control over China. “The whole episode, as it unfolded, became a turning point in Japanese-American relations, as the United States became more and more apprehensive about Japanese intentions in China. President Wilson called the Twenty-one Demands a ‘suspicious business’…Chinese efforts to invite the Western powers’ intervention in its favor helped create the popular image of Japan as an aggressor, and further aroused American suspicion of Japan.”
Tensions between Japan and the United States rose just prior to the United States’ entry into World War II. The United States opposed Japan’s invasion and treatment of China but had no plans to take military action. Despite the isolationist ideologies of many Americans, President Roosevelt, “wanted Japan to withdraw its forces from China,” and ultimately “announced that the United States was freezing Japanese assets in the United States.” This was misunderstood by the Japanese to mean that the United States was cutting off trade with Japan. Japan immediately grew concerned with the amount of oil left in their reserves and “hoped that a sudden, devastating strike on Pearl Harbor would stun the United States” and that “America would then give Japan the freedom to carry out its war in Asia.” Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States entered World War II as an Allied Power and the relationship with Imperial Japan continued to decline, especially given the use of Japanese internment camps in the United States.
Truman and his Foreign Policy Decision Making Style
The most important aspect of President Truman’s foreign policy decision making style is that each decision or comment he made on foreign policy was rooted in his love for the United States and his belief that no country on Earth was better. Despite this, he still believed in internationalist principles. “Nonetheless, Truman identified with Wilsonian internationalism, especially the League of Nations, and as a senator he supported President Franklin Roosevelt on the World Court, neutrality revision, rearmament, and Lend Lease for Britain in Russia…But his internationalism reflected unquestioned faith in American moral superiority, and his foreign policy proposals largely comprised military preparedness,” In terms of his foreign policy decision making process, history tends to look at Truman kindly. “Historians rated Truman a ‘near great’ president, crediting his administration with reconstructing Western Europe and Japan, resisting Soviet or Communist aggression from Greece to Korea, and forging collective security through NATO,” Truman regularly consulted with advisors, and leaned on them for aid considering his sudden entry into the White House and his lack of world knowledge at the time. In 1945, the most relevant advisors to President Truman included Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, Secretary of the Treasury Frederick Moore, Secretary of War Henry Lewis Stimson, and Secretary of the Navy James Vincent Forrestal. Truman’s consistent search for advisory opinions led to “abrupt style and conflicting advice” that “produced inconsistent policy,” but his reputation “stands high.”
Political Pressures on Truman in 1945
President Truman undoubtedly inherited the presidency during an extraordinarily tumultuous time in history. Political pressures at home and abroad were on the forefront. President Truman’s political pressures stateside in 1945 and at the time of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki almost entirely consisted of the need to lead the United States and the Allied Powers to a successful end to World War II. Along with the pressure of war came economic pressures—President Truman’s work was laid out from the start. On the international front, “tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States began to mount as both nations looked to shape the post-war international order in line with their interests…the inability to settle outstanding issues, such as the future of Germany, the boundaries of postwar Poland, and the nature of wartime reparations hinted at serious underlying differences between the two nations.” Almost immediately following the culmination of World War II, the United States found itself in the Cold War with the former Soviet Union, and soon after this, the Korean War began. Once again, President Truman was under immense pressure. “Postwar harmony was short-lived during the Truman administration. In 1949, the Soviet Union would detonate its own atomic bomb, formally launching the Cold War arms race. This was accompanied by serious charges of espionage and the vulnerability of American secrets…These developments would see President Truman’s popularity drop into the low 30th percentile.”
The Blasts Heard Around the World: Hiroshima and Nagasaki
In 1939, Albert Einstein wrote a letter to President Theodore Roosevelt, warning that Germany had an increased interest in uranium ore supplies and recommended that federal funds be allocated to speed up ongoing experimental nuclear physics work in university laboratories. Immediately following this letter, Roosevelt created an Advisory Committee on Uranium that began to study nuclear fission and the use of uranium in nuclear weaponry. “The Advisory Committee on Uranium reported to the President…that the chain reaction was a possibility, but that it was still unproved…If the reaction should be explosive, ‘it would provide a possible source of bombs with a destructiveness vastly greater than anything now known.’” This began the United States’ highly secretive process of creating nuclear weapons, known as the Manhattan Project. Even President Truman was not aware of this project until he became president following the death of President Roosevelt. When Truman was sworn in on April 12, 1945, he “was informed by Stimson of a new and terrible weapon being developed by physicists in New Mexico. In his diary that night, Truman noted that he had been informed that the U.S. was perfecting an explosive great enough to destroy the whole world.” Truman was not fully briefed on the project until April 24th, after Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote to him and said, “Dear Mr. President: I think it is very important that I should have a talk with you as soon as possible on a highly secret matter…It, however, has such a bearing on our present foreign relations and has such an important effect upon all my thinking in this field that I think you ought to know about it without much further delay.” Of course, the intention of President Roosevelt in dedicating resources to the project was to use the weaponry in warfare. Since the concern was that Germany, one of the Axis Powers, was working to quickly develop the technology, it was thought that the United States would use the bombs on Adolf Hitler and Fascist Germany. After the death of Roosevelt and the end of the war in the European Theatre, Truman was left with cutting-edge weaponry and no apparent answer as to whether it should be used during World War II. “The information thrust upon Truman a momentous decision: whether or not to use the world’s first weapon of mass destruction.” During this time, Truman was adamant about bringing an end to the war. “Our demand has been, and it remains—Unconditional Surrender! We will not traffic with the breakers of the peace on the terms of the peace.” One important piece of this history is the existence of Operation Downfall. The American commanders were responsible for planning the invasion that was meant to force Japan to surrender and preserve Allied lives. Given the detected high mobilization of Japanese forces to Kyushu (where the invasion was planned to take place), the casualty estimates for Operation Downfall were extraordinarily high. Estimates of these casualties vary and are not well documented. It is known that the United States government manufactured half-a-million Purple Hearts for the battle that were never used. Enough were made that the United States was able to keep Purple Hearts (that were manufactured for the invasion of Kyushu) on hand through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to put into perspective how many casualties were estimated. During the planning of this invasion, the United States, Britain, and China released the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, which detailed the terms for Japan’s surrender. This included terms that would ensure Japan relinquished its imperialist ways, cooperated with postwar plans, and ceased any war operations. The Declaration was an ultimatum, ending with the statement, “We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.” Once Japan rejected the terms of the Potsdam Declaration through silence, and the looming possibility of a high-casualty invasion of Japan, President Truman had to make an important decision—to use nuclear weapons on the Japanese to thwart imperialism, or to risk hundreds of thousands of Allied lives.
Timeline of Truman’s Decision to Bomb and Advisory Opinions
The decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan was deliberated for a lengthy period and was multifaceted with the president and his cabinet taking countless factors into consideration. Since this was the first development and use of a nuclear weapon in the history of warfare, the discussions of carrying out a nuclear attack on Japan took place well in advance. With the inception and success of the Manhattan Project arising at the end of World War II, the United States was attempting to find a way to force Japan into surrendering since they knew Japan would likely not do so on their own.
Prior to the atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, elements existed within the Japanese government that were trying to find a way to end the war. In June and July 1945, Japan attempted to enlist the help of the Soviet Union to serve as an intermediary in negotiations. No direct communication occurred with the United States about peace talks, but American leaders knew of these maneuvers because the United States for a long time had been intercepting and decoding many internal Japanese diplomatic communications. From these intercepts, the United States learned that some within the Japanese government advocated outright surrender. A few diplomats overseas cabled home to urge just that. From the replies these diplomats received from Tokyo, the United States learned that anything Japan might agree to would not be a surrender so much as a ‘negotiated peace’ involving numerous conditions. These conditions probably would require, at a minimum, that the Japanese home islands remain unoccupied by foreign forces and even allow Japan to retain some of its wartime conquests in East Asia. Many within the Japanese government were extremely reluctant to discuss any concessions, which would mean that a ‘negotiated peace’ to them would only amount to little more than a truce where the Allies agreed to stop attacking Japan. After twelve years of Japanese military aggression against China and over three and one-half years of war with the United States (begun with the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor), American leaders were reluctant to accept anything less than a complete Japanese surrender.
Unfortunately, the intercepted messages are housed in the National Archives, but have not been digitized. These intercepted messages ultimately proved to be integral in the decision President Truman had to make about whether he would proceed with an invasion of Kyushu or drop the atomic bombs. Knowing that Japan would not unconditionally surrender, and that the Allied Powers would not accept anything less, allows for an easily understandable explanation of the timeline of President Truman’s decision. For the purposes of determining whether intelligence played a role in the final decision to drop the bomb, the beginning of serious discussions about the attack began in May 1945. In May, Secretary of War Stimson created an Interim Committee of the Manhattan Project “with approval of the President,” consisting of various cabinet members (including Stimson himself) and scientists that was meant to convene regularly to “study and report on the matter of temporary war-time controls and publicity and to make recommendations on post-war research, development, and control, and on legislation necessary for these purposes,” in relation to the nuclear weapons. “The Committee’s recommendations were to be submitted to the S/W [Secretary of War], and through him to the President.” On June 1th, 1945, minutes from the Committee Meeting stated, “Mr. [James F.] Byrnes, and the Committee agreed, that the Secretary of War should be advised that, while recognizing that the final selection of the target was essentially a military decision, the present view of the Committee was that the bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible; that it be used on a war plant surrounded by workers’ homes; and that it be used without prior warning.” Later, it was noted in a document summarizing the events of May and June 1945 that “The S/W was in agreement on (1) and (2),” “(2)” meaning the recommendation to use the bomb against Japan. There were multiple discussions about how to use the bomb and whether it should be kept a secret until the actual use. For example, one of the scientists, Ernest Lawrence, “suggested that a demonstration of the atomic bomb might possibly convince the Japanese to surrender. This was rejected, however, out of fear that the bomb might be a dud, that the Japanese might put American prisoners of war in the area, or that they might manage to shoot down the plane. The shock value of the new weapon could also be lost.” Given the fact that the Committee and Stimson agreed by June 1st that the bomb should be dropped on Japan, it is likely that Truman also decided that the bomb would be dropped within this general time frame as well, but the discussions from May to August 1945 created many additional variables that Truman had to take into consideration prior to giving the final authorization to drop the bomb.
In a diary entry from June 10th, it was noted that, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff held a special meeting to hear details of the pending Pacific operation to defeat the Japanese, prepared by the planning staff. These plans contemplated invasion of the Japanese mainland. Leahy wrote that none then knew the potentialities of the atomic bomb but it was his opinion and he urged it strongly on the Joint Chiefs that no major invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary to win the war. He wrote ‘the JCS did order the preparation of plans for an invasion but the invasion itself was never authorized.’” By June 18th, 1945, a meeting between President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was convened to discuss “Details of the Campaign Against Japan.” The Joint Chiefs determined that on November 1st, 1945, the United States would carry out an attack on Kyushu, Japan. They estimated that by then the United States’ “air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities” and “The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.” Additionally, “Important considerations bearing the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.” The Joint Chiefs had difficulty estimating casualties for this campaign, but believed “that the first 30 days Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon” The documents display that the U.S. casualties in Luzon reached 31,000. The main concern during these deliberations was the risk of losing a high number of American lives and needlessly spending American dollars. There was also concern that if planning for this invasion did not begin immediately, that the United States would be unprepared to carry out the attack. At this meeting, there was no discussion of using nuclear weapons against Japan as part of this attack, but it is important to note that it was mentioned that “We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations.” With the use of this language and the knowledge that the Manhattan Project was far underway, it is difficult to ignore that the use of the atomic bomb might have been considered as part of the discussion of “air bombardment” in this meeting regarding an invasion of Kyushu. When the meeting culminated, President Truman “reiterated that his main reason for this conference with the Chiefs of Staff was his desire to know definitely how far we could afford to go in the Japanese campaign. He had hoped that there was a possibility of preventing an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other. He was clear on the situation now and was quite sure that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should proceed with the Kyushu operation.”
Following this meeting, President Truman embarked on his journey to the Potsdam Conference, held in Germany from July 17 to August 2, 1945. The purpose of the meetings was for President Truman, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Secretary Joseph Stalin to discuss and plan postwar peace. While President Truman was at the conference, several advancements occurred. First, on July 17th, Truman received a petition from members of the atomic power scientist community imploring him to avoid the use of nuclear weaponry.
Discoveries of which the people of the United States are not aware may affect the welfare of this nation in the near future…It places in your hands, as Commander-in-Chief, the fateful decision whether or not to sanction the use of such bombs in the present phase of the war against Japan…Until recently we have had to fear that the United States might be attacked by atomic bombs during this war and that her only defense might lie in a counterattack by the same means. Today, with the defeat of Germany, this danger is averted and we feel impelled to say what follows:…We feel, however, that such attacks on Japan could not be justified, at least not unless the terms which will be imposed after the war on Japan were made public in detail and Japan were given an opportunity to surrender…if Japan still refused to surrender our nation might then, in certain circumstances, find itself forced to resort to the use of atomic bombs. Such a step, however, ought not to be made at any time without seriously considering the moral responsibilities which are involved.
Immediately following the signing of this petition on July 18th, Secretary Stimson received a memo from Major General Leslie R. Groves detailing the first successful detonation of an atomic bomb in New Mexico that took place two days prior. The detonation, known as the Trinity Test, “was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone.” General Groves also states, “We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.” On July 24th, after President Truman received word of this success, he “approached Stalin without an interpreter and, as casually as he could, told him that the United States had a ‘new weapon of unusual destructive force.’ Stalin showed little interest, replying only that he hoped the United States would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’” The reason for Stalin’s “little interest” was because he was already aware of the nuclear test. Soviet intelligence was spying on the program since its inception.
By July 24th, plans had been put in place to drop the bombs. In a memo for General Arnold from Colonel John Stone, multiple targets were listed as places that the bomb could be dropped. The targets included Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Kokura, and Niigata. Colonel Stone believed that the first bomb would “be ready to drop between August 1 and 10” and there were plans “to drop it the first day of good weather following readiness.” The final, official, written order to attack the Japanese with the atomic bombs came from Acting Army Chief of Staff, Thomas Handy, the next day. Since George Marshall was with President Truman at the Potsdam Conference, Handy sent the orders to Commanding General Carl Spaatz. Handy states:
The 509 Composite Group, 20th Air Force will deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather will permit visual bombing after about 3 August 1945 on one of the targets: Hiroshima, Kokura, Nilgata and Nagasaki…
Additional bombs will be delivered on the above targets as soon as made ready by the project staff…
Dissemination of any and all information concerning the use of the weapon against Japan is reserved to the Secretary of War and the President of the United States…
The forgoing directive is issued to you by direction and with the approval of the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, USA…
The following day on July 26th, the Potsdam Declaration was issued to Japan. Once it was apparent that the Japanese were not unconditionally surrendering and accepting the terms of the Declaration, the time came for President Truman to make his final decision. The president, his staff, and Secretary Stimson were suddenly thrust into writing and editing the statements that would be released immediately upon the use of the weapons. In a letter to the president, Secretary Stimson said, "it is now essential that statement for release by you be available not later than Wednesday, 1 August.” The first use of nuclear weapons in warfare was rapidly coming to fruition.
When the first bomb was dropped on August 6th (the bomb was named Little Boy), the President and Secretary of War immediately released their statements. President Truman justifies his actions and warns of the next attack by stating, “It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.” Three days later, the second nuclear bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. In the interim, Senator Richard Russell from Georgia expressed his desire for the attack on Kyushu to commence at full force. The President responded on the day of the bombing of Nagasaki and said, “I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can’t bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in the same manner. For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole populations because of the ‘pigheadedness’ of the leaders of a nation and, for your information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary…My object is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane feeling for the women and children in Japan.”
Following the second bombing in Nagasaki, the United States made the decision to drop leaflets on the Japanese warning them that they should evacuate their cities immediately. “Because your military leaders have rejected the thirteen part surrender declaration, two momentous events have occurred in the last few days…Before we use this bomb again and again to destroy every resource of the military by which they are prolonging this useless war, petition the Emperor now to end the war…Act at once or we shall resolutely employ this bomb and all our other superior weapons to promptly and forcefully end the war.” On August 15th, Japan surrendered. The war was over.
U.S. Intelligence: Did it Play a Role?
Given the evidence provided from primary and secondary sources, the short answer to the question of whether U.S. intelligence played a role in the president’s decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is yes. Without U.S. intelligence initially intercepting messages between Japanese diplomats that expressed the government’s desire to continue fighting and not surrender to the allies, the plans for an invasion of Kyushu might have never been drafted, casualty estimates never would have been made, Truman would never have had to weigh the risks between high battle casualties and atomic bomb casualties, and he never would have arrived at the conclusion following this chain of events to drop the atomic bombs. Additionally, President Truman was able to weigh the options of whether to use the weapons to force a surrender based upon intelligence regarding the number of troops that Japan was mobilizing towards Kyushu.
Alternatively, it is conclusive that U.S. intelligence did not have a direct effect on the president’s decision-making process. In other words, Truman did not receive a piece of intelligence that immediately caused him to decide to drop atomic bombs on Japan. The chain of events that occurred throughout this process that led to the dropping of the atomic bomb was drawn out and considered with multiple types of information factored into the decision. Countless deliberations between scientists, the president, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, cabinet members, and military leaders took place with facts and figures from prior experience, scientific data, and of course intelligence included. With all the information documented throughout this process, it would be naïve to state that intelligence played no role. Intelligence allowed the Allies to know where the Japanese stood on the issue of an unconditional surrender, and that piece of information was invaluable to the rest of the advisory process. While one limitation of this case study is the lack of digitized primary intelligence documents from the Truman administration during this time, the amount of alternative information that is provided detailing the president’s decision making process, thoughts from cabinet members and various meetings regarding the forced surrender of Japan was invaluable to the understanding of how the decision to drop the atomic bomb was made and what the advisory process and intelligence of the time looked like for the Allied Powers.
It is impossible to know for certain what might have happened without U.S. intelligence during this period of World War II. While there might have been more intelligence at the time than we are privy to in the modern day given the limitations of record keeping and digitization in the 1940’s, it is still safe to say that U.S. intelligence played a large role in the president’s decision-making process to drop the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
Conclusion
Whether it was “right” or “wrong” of President Truman to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is highly debated and has been debated since August 6th and 9th, 1945. The attacks were brutal and had long lasting effects on the Japanese, but President Truman maintained until the day he died that he had regrets about the decision. His grandson Daniel told The Guardian, “Photographer Joe O’Donnell ‘asked my grandfather point blank, ‘Did you ever have any regrets about that?’ My grandfather said, ‘Hell, yes.’ You don’t do something like that without thinking about it. ‘He didn’t want to have to do it but he felt that he had to, to stop the war and to save both American and Japanese lives. The reports they were getting were that, in a land invasion of the Japanese main islands, the Japanese were building up forces to resist. Now we know the Japanese knew where we planned to land and they were massing troops,” Despite the various arguments that are made both for and against the dropping of the bombs, it is clear through the documentation of Truman’s advisory process and decision making, that it was a carefully considered decision, made based upon facts and intercepted Japanese communication. Examining this presidential foreign policy decision is a fascinating display of intelligence playing an integral role in the lead-up and advisory process to a foreign policy decision. President Truman made this decision to save as many lives as he possibly could, both Allied and Axis, using U.S. intelligence shared with him throughout his advisory process.